Mohammad Amin Aghamiri, head of Iran’s National Cyberspace Center, claimed at an October 13 press conference that authorities possess several systems capable of disconnecting Starlink terminals and can bring the technology under control. Yet the account of his remarks provides no independently assessable test results, coverage measurements, or evidence of how long those systems remain effective. Without that evidence, his claims amount to bluster.

The question is not whether Starlink terminals can suffer interference. They can, and documented evidence shows that they have. The question is whether disrupting some terminals demonstrates the ability to keep Starlink offline across an entire country. Technical terminology and references to secret technology do not bridge that gap.

Even Aghamiri Does Not Present GPS Spoofing as the Main Explanation

Despite the impression the coverage might leave, Aghamiri did not say authorities had found a way to shut down Starlink simply by disrupting its positioning system. He portrayed GPS spoofing—the transmission of false positioning signals—as an unsuccessful attempt by outside observers to explain Iran’s methods. He also said the technique had been tested and worked in some circumstances, while downplaying its importance.

Aghamiri referred to phased-array antennas, moving satellites, and the handover of connections between them. He argued that Starlink would have to be a very weak technology to fail solely because of GPS spoofing.

None of this explains how the systems he claims Iran possesses actually work, or how effective they are. Describing a network’s complexity is not evidence of an ability to disable it.

Field Evidence Does Not Support a Victory Claim

In its recent reports, NasNet, found that interference varied by neighborhood and time of day. Some areas were unaffected, while others experienced packet loss of between 10 and 40 percent. The disruption was reported primarily in Tehran.

The same report stated that Starlink connectivity remained operational despite the interference. These findings do not support the idea that all government attempts were ineffective. They also do not justify presenting regional disruption as the defeat of Starlink.

For users, a sharp decline in connection quality can interrupt video calls, file transfers, and ordinary browsing. But degraded service does not necessarily mean that every communication path has been closed. Filterwatch explains that even under severe packet loss, small messages may still get through as data is retransmitted during brief windows of connectivity.

Disrupting GPS Does Not Automatically Disable Starlink

GPS and Starlink’s internet link are separate systems. The effect of positioning interference on connectivity depends on how a terminal uses location information and what alternatives it supports.

In a January 15, 2026 technical mailing-list exchange about Iran, Starlink hardware researcher Oleg Kutkov explained that terminals can determine their position using the Starlink satellite constellation rather than GPS. That capability addresses positioning interference; it does not guarantee protection against every method of disrupting communications.

Kutkov’s explanation is not a guarantee covering every terminal model and software version. It does, however, undermine the assumption that disrupting GPS necessarily puts Starlink out of action.

Starlink Is Not Immune to Interference

Challenging Aghamiri’s claims does not require inventing a myth of Starlink’s invulnerability. In a 2022 technical study on sharing the 12 GHz spectrum band, SpaceX itself modeled severe interference and terminal outages under a particular scenario involving a terrestrial mobile network.

That study concerned modeled conditions in the United States. It provides no evidence of the capabilities of the Islamic Republic’s equipment. It does, however, demonstrate why dismissing interference as technically impossible would be wrong.

The issue is scale, persistence, and measurable results. Disconnecting one terminal in a particular location, disconnecting every terminal in a city, and sustaining a nationwide service blackout are three different claims. Each requires its own evidence.

Secrecy Is No Substitute for Evidence

Aghamiri does not need to publish equipment blueprints to make his claims assessable. He could disclose how many terminals were affected, across what area, for how long, and whether they experienced intermittent disruption or complete outages. He could also explain how the tests distinguished deliberate interference from hardware faults, physical obstructions, or other causes of connection failure.

Until such information is available, the assertion that Iran possesses several systems remains unsubstantiated. Public evidence documents both interference and continued connectivity. It does not establish sustained nationwide control over Starlink.

If Iran’s National Cyberspace Center claims that capability, it needs to produce results that can be scrutinized. A string of technical terms is no substitute for proof.