How the Islamic Republic Tracks Its Citizens, With Chinese Inspiration
When citizens in cities like Isfahan, Rasht, or Tehran suddenly receive threatening SMS messages about violating mandatory dress codes (AKA: Hijab) or other social norms, few realize the complex hybrid surveillance infrastructure that drives this digital repression. While headlines in state-affiliated and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked media often highlight facial recognition or “smart policing,” the true strength of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s evolving system lies in a multi-layered architecture that connects mobile phone tracking, national ID cards, and public transport data. This model is clearly inspired by the People’s Republic of China’s authoritarian digital governance and is rapidly taking root inside Iran’s political system.
The Iranian cleric regime’s 25-year strategic agreement with the People’s Republic of China explicitly includes cooperation on artificial intelligence, telecommunications, surveillance equipment, and smart city technologies. While Iran lacks China’s full AI capabilities and its comprehensive “Skynet” surveillance network, the ideological commitment to building a similarly integrated system is evident. The emphasis is on seamless linking of identity and mobility, not just passive video monitoring.
Evolving Beyond Facial Recognition
Iranian authorities praise China’s model of digital control and surveillance. The 2023 “Hijab and Chastity” Law mandates the use of cameras and artificial intelligence to enforce mandatory dress codes. State media frequently showcase surveillance cameras and facial recognition software, promising full national deployment.
Yet research shows that Iran’s facial recognition capabilities remain limited and fragmented. No national facial recognition system is fully operational. Deployment of Chinese-made cameras in selected banks, tourist areas, and some metro stations exists, but domestic software remains basic.
Thus, while the People’s Republic of China integrates millions of cameras into unified databases with real-time analysis, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s current system is more about political signaling and psychological deterrence than automated enforcement.
The Hybrid Model: Tracking Identity and Movement
Where the Islamic Republic of Iran has made the most tangible progress is in hybrid tracking, not in facial recognition, but in linking citizens’ identity to their digital and physical movements. This hybrid system now rests on three main pillars.
First, every mobile phone number in Iran must be registered to a verified national identity. Special interception devices deployed in public spaces, such as metro stations or demonstration areas, can capture unique identifiers from mobile phones. These are then cross-referenced with national identity databases to establish the real-world identity of the phone user.
Second, Iran’s smart national ID card acts as the core of digital identity. It stores biometric data and links the citizen’s profile across various government platforms, including judicial systems, social services, and mobile registration. In practice, this enables security services to match license plates captured by surveillance cameras with a citizen’s verified identity and to automate the issuance of SMS warnings or further sanctions.
Third, public transport networks in major cities require RFID-based smart cards for metro and bus access. This generates detailed movement data for each citizen - entry and exit points, travel patterns - that is accessible to security agencies. While promoted as a convenience, these systems closely mirror public transport surveillance in the People’s Republic of China, where metro and bus usage forms a core component of population tracking.
How the SMS Warning System Works
The clearest and most alarming outcome of this hybrid model is the SMS warning system currently used to enforce mandatory dress codes and other public behavior rules.
This is how the process unfolds. If a citizen, often a woman without full mandatory dress code (Hijab) compliance, is identified in public space, either through surveillance cameras or manual reporting by regime loyalists using dedicated mobile apps, the system collects identity data. In some cases, handheld IMSI-catchers are used to capture mobile phone identifiers, or vehicle license plates are linked with national ID records. In others, RFID-based card proximity can reveal identity.
Once the individual is identified, their registered phone number is typically extracted and used to send the warning SMS. However, in line with the cleric regime of Iran’s broader policy of exerting pressure through family networks, the system is also designed to target close relatives. In many cases, warning messages are deliberately sent to family members, such as fathers or brothers, even when the individual’s own phone number is fully known. This tactic aims to shame and intimidate the person within their family structure, amplifying the psychological impact of the surveillance.
The message warns the recipient about observed behavioral violations, referencing time and location. This process is fully automated: no direct police interaction is required to trigger the warning. In pilot implementations in cities like Isfahan and Rasht, this model has proven extremely effective at both punishing the targeted individual and creating widespread chilling effects among the population.
Notably, this system has also been used against family members, illustrating how the regime leverages digital surveillance not just for direct repression but also to isolate dissenters through familial and social pressure.
Lessons From China
The hybrid architecture described here is closely modeled on the surveillance system of the People’s Republic of China. Chinese practice has long demonstrated that comprehensive identity integration, not merely camera coverage, is the foundation of effective digital control. Iranian policymakers and security officials openly admire and seek to emulate this model.
Yet significant differences remain. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s databases remain fragmented and lack full real-time interoperability. Domestic artificial intelligence development is still modest compared to China’s capabilities. Furthermore, social resistance and technical limitations have slowed the full unification of these systems.
Still, the trajectory is unmistakable. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s collaboration with Chinese firms, especially in telecommunications and surveillance hardware, continues to deepen. The architecture of hybrid surveillance is now fully institutionalized in Iranian security doctrine.
Conclusion
The Islamic Republic of Iran does not yet operate a surveillance grid as sophisticated as the People’s Republic of China’s. But in one critical dimension, the ability to seamlessly link identity with mobility and to automate repression through tools such as the SMS warning system, Iran’s progress is undeniable.
The system already operates with sufficient precision to target not only specific women but also their family members, a tactic designed to multiply fear and enforce behavioral compliance across social networks.
Unless checked by international scrutiny and domestic opposition, this hybrid model is poised to expand further. Its foundation is laid; its logic is drawn from China’s authoritarian playbook; and its ultimate aim is clear: to transform Iran’s public space into a fully monitored and controllable domain.