Cutting Iran Off From the World on the Road to Becoming North Korea
The “Countering Infiltration” bill would make media, academic, and civil-society contacts with the outside world subject to authorization by the Ministry of Intelligence and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence Organization.
On Sunday, August 16, 2026, the Islamic Consultative Assembly approved the general outlines of a bill titled “Countering the Infiltration of Foreign Intelligence Services, Governments, or Entities into the Country.” The bill’s individual provisions have not yet been approved or officially published. However, according to accounts provided by informed sources, members of parliament, and security experts, one of the “security gaps” left unaddressed by the earlier Law on Intensifying Punishments for Espionage is the regulation of “communications with foreign parties.” This report examines those restrictions.
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A “Legal Gap” for Criminalizing Infiltration
The Islamic Republic of Iran has already used laws and regulations to criminalize many ordinary forms of communication, from watching satellite television to accessing the uncensored internet. Officials now claim, however, that existing laws do not comprehensively cover what they describe as “gradual and networked infiltration.” Ebrahim Azizi, chair of parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, has described the new bill as an attempt to remedy a “delay” in criminalizing infiltration.
Iran’s Islamic Penal Code already criminalizes espionage, the disclosure of secrets, and cooperation with hostile governments. In 2025, parliament also passed legislation intensifying punishments for espionage and cooperation with Israel and other hostile states. The purported “gap,” therefore, is not the absence of penalties for espionage. A review of the details disclosed so far indicates that the new bill instead targets conduct that lacks the conventional elements of espionage.
Article 1 would make the submission of policy, legislative, or executive proposals under the direction of foreign parties punishable by up to 30 years in prison if it produces consequences such as “undermining public trust in the establishment” or reducing electoral participation. The Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC Intelligence Organization would be responsible for supplying evidence of such “foreign direction.”
Registering Media Contacts With the Ministry of Intelligence
Article 6 defines interviews, conversations, or “any form of communication” with media outlets designated as “hostile”—including American or Israeli media—as an offense punishable by a Grade 6 prison sentence of more than six months to two years. The Secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council would be required to publish an annual list of these outlets. Contacts with other foreign media would also have to be registered through a Ministry of Intelligence system. This mechanism could create a centralized database of citizens who communicate with media organizations outside Iran.
Article 7 would make sending any message, photograph, video, audio recording, or data to a non-Iranian media outlet—or to a person working for a foreign media organization—punishable by a Grade 6 prison sentence. The existence of a work contract, an allegation that the sender intended to act against national security, or the transmission of information during protests or a crisis would increase the punishment to a Grade 5 prison sentence of more than two to five years.
This provision could turn the documentation of protests and the transmission of evidence of state violence or human-rights violations into national-security offenses.
Security Authorization for Science and Civil Society
Article 3 would prohibit the provision of any information, report, or statistical data to non-Iranian entities or foreign nationals without authorization from the Ministry of Intelligence. Violations would be punishable by a Grade 5 prison sentence and permanent disqualification from employment in the relevant profession. The provision draws no clear distinction between classified information and publicly available data.
Article 4 would require nongovernmental organizations, associations, civic groups, and political parties to obtain authorization before receiving foreign funding, training, or financial benefits. Approval would be issued by a working group comprising representatives of the ministries of intelligence, interior, and foreign affairs, as well as the IRGC Intelligence Organization. Violations could result in the dissolution of the organization, imprisonment of its directors, and bans of between five and 15 years on cultural and social activity.
The Ministry of Intelligence would also be required to compile a list of foreign universities and institutions approved for scholarships, contracts, conferences, and academic cooperation. Cooperation with institutions outside this list, as well as the transfer of medical, research, or archaeological samples, would be punishable by a Grade 6 prison sentence.
Contact with embassies or non-Iranian organizations—except for personal and administrative matters—would similarly require prior notification and written authorization from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Preventive Surveillance of Cultural Production
The bill also extends to cultural works. Judicial and security authorities could halt a work while it is still in production if they determine that it was created under foreign direction and portrays Iran in a “negative light.” Its creators could also face permanent professional disqualification.
Article 18 establishes punishments even for negligence, a failure to recognize that another party had ties to a “foreign entity,” and certain preparatory acts.
All offenses under the bill would be tried before Revolutionary Courts, which could also order the confiscation of property, the dissolution of legal entities, and professional bans.
The bill, therefore, is not merely about punishing interviews. By approving its general outlines, parliament has endorsed the foundations of a legal architecture that would turn the Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC Intelligence Organization into gatekeepers for Iranians’ media, academic, civic, and cultural contacts with the outside world.